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Two–Person Cake-Cutting: The Optimal Number of Cuts1 
 
Abstract 
A cake is a metaphor for a heterogeneous, divisible good.  When two players divide such 
a good, there is always a perfect division—one that is efficient (Pareto-optimal), envy-
free, and equitable—which can be effected with a finite number of cuts under certain 
mild conditions; this is not always the case when there are more than two players (Brams, 
Jones, and Klamler, 2011b).  We not only establish the existence of such a division but 
also provide an algorithm for determining where and how many cuts must be made, 
relating it to an algorithm, “Adjusted Winner” (Brams and Taylor, 1996, 1999), that 
yields a perfect division of multiple homogenous goods.   
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There has been a substantial literature on cake-cutting over the past fifteen years; 
books giving overviews of both existence results and algorithms for physically cutting a 
cake include Brams and Taylor (1996), Robertson and Webb (1998), Barbanel (2005), 
and Brams (2008).  Review articles of the fair-division literature that discuss cake-cutting 
include Brams (2006) and Klamler (2010).  
 
Recent algorithms, involving both discrete and continuous (moving-knife) 
procedures, are analyzed in Barbanel and Brams (2004, 2011) and Brams, Jones, and 
Klamler (2006, 2011a, 2011b).  There is also a growing literature on pie-cutting (Brams, 
Jones, and Klamler, 2008; Barbanel, Brams, and Stromquist, 2009; Barbanel and Brams, 
2011), in which radial cuts are made from the center of a pie rather than parallel cuts 
being made along the edge of a cake.   
 
A key question that has not been addressed in most of this literature is how many 
cuts are required to give what we call a perfect division of a cake (or pie)—one that 
satisfies the following three properties that encapsulate the idea of fair division: 
 
1. Efficiency (Pareto-optimality): There is no other division that gives each player a 
portion that he or she values at least as much and that one player values strictly 
more.  
2. Envy-freeness: Each player values his or her portion at least as much as that of 
every other player and, consequently, does not envy any other player. 
                                                 
1 We gratefully acknowledge the valuable comments of Peter Landweber and Ariel D. Procaccia on an 
earlier version of this paper. 
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3. Equitability: Each player values his or her portion exactly the same as other 
players value their own portions—that is, each player thinks that his or her portion 
is the same fraction of his or her perceived value of the entire cake. 
 
If there are n > 2 players, there may be no perfect division of a cake (Brams, Jones, and 
Klamler, 2011b).  But if n = 2, we prove there is such a division; how many cuts are 
required depends on the players’ preferences for different parts of the cake.   
 
It is well known that if n = 2 and only one cut is allowed, there is a division that 
satisfies properties (2) and (3) (Jones, 2002)—but not necessarily property (1)—though 
no algorithm is known for obtaining it (Brams, Jones, and Klamler, 2006).  But if more 
than one cut is allowed, efficiency can generally be obtained, as we will show, at least if 
the players have the help of a referee who has complete information about their 
preferences.2 
 
To illustrate the problem of limiting two players to one cut, think of a cake in 
which player 1 most likes the parts near the edges, whereas player 2 most likes the part 
around the center.  Then an efficient division would be to give player 1 the two parts near 
the edges, and player 2 the remainder around the center, which requires two cuts.  This 
efficient division can be made equitable with appropriate cuts—giving each player, say, 
¾ of the cake as each values it—which is also envy-free since both players receive more 
than half the value of the cake. 
 
We give conditions under which there exists an optimal number of cuts, by which 
we mean a number such that fewer cuts are not sufficient to give a perfect division and 
more do not help.  Beyond demonstrating the existence of a perfect division for two 
players, we provide an algorithm for (i) determining the optimal number of cuts (if such a 
number exists) and (ii) specifying where they must be made.  Not only are our results 
constructive, but we also show that our algorithm is applicable to pie-cutting and related 
to a discrete algorithm, “Adjusted Winner” (Brams and Taylor, 1996, 1999; Jones, 2002; 
Brams, 2008), for dividing multiple homogenous goods.   
 
A cake, by contrast, is a single heterogeneous good, which the players may value 
different parts of differently.  While the cake may be a swirl of flavors and toppings, we 
assume that the players can attach a value to it at every point along an edge. (We will be 
more specific about these values in the next section, when we introduce probability 
density functions.)  Physically, the cake may be thought of as a rectangle, valued along an 
edge, but it could be any shape and valued along a straight line that passes through it.   
 
In section 2, we state the measure-theoretic assumptions we make about a cake as 
a mathematical object when valued along a line segment. We then briefly describe our 
algorithm for dividing it, based on the information that the players provide to a referee 
                                                 
2 Consequences of this assumption for pie-cutting are discussed in Barbanel and Brams (2011).  Suffice it 
to say here that it is easier for a referee to compute an equitable division of a cake between two players than 
it is of a pie, which requires a continuous comparison of the values of the different players’ pieces as 
“moving knives” are rotated. 
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about their subjective valuations of the cake, but we reserve for section 3 the details of its 
implementation. 
 
In section 3, we introduce a geometric framework for viewing and analyzing our 
algorithm, and we illustrate its use with several examples, showing how it succeeds in 
finding a perfect division under different conditions.  We complement this analysis in 
section 4 by showing, for certain classes of situations, how to calculate the number of 
cuts needed to obtain a perfect division; only in extreme cases is an infinite number of 
cuts required.  
 
In section 5, we show that Adjusted Winner can be viewed as a special case of our 
algorithm.  Adjusted Winner was first analyzed in Brams and Taylor (1996), popularized 
in Brams and Taylor (1999), and patented by New York University in 1999.  NYU 
licensed the patent rights to a Boston law firm in 2007; the firm formed a company, Fair 
Outcomes, Inc., which markets it and other patented fair-division algorithms.  In section 
6, we offer some concluding remarks, emphasizing the applicability of our algorithm to 
real-life problems of fair division, such as the division of land. 
 
2.  Assumptions and the Cake-Cutting Algorithm 
 
We make the following assumptions about the cake to be divided and the players’ 
valuations of it: 
 
1. The cake C comprises the unit interval [0,1].  There are two players, player 1 and 
player 2, whom we will refer to as “he” and “she,” respectively. 
2. A piece of cake refers to a connected subset of the cake.  A portion of cake is a 
finite collection of pieces. 
3. Player 1 and player 2 have probability density functions (pdfs) f1 and f2, 
respectively, whose domain is the cake (i.e., the interval [0,1]), with each taking 
on only positive values.3  The total area under the graphs of each of these 
functions is 1, as required for a pdf.  
4. We define functions µ1 and µ2, called measures, whose domain consists of the set 
of all portions of cake, and whose values for a given portion of cake are given by 
the area under the parts of the graphs of f1 and f2, respectively, that correspond to 
that portion of cake. 
 
Intuitively, we may view the pdfs f1 and f2 as giving a value for the worth of every 
point of cake to each of the players.  To be sure, any single point has value zero to each 
player, but areas corresponding to intervals and collections of intervals of cake—given by 
µ1 and µ2—have positive value.  If we are given the measures µ1 and µ2, we can obtain 
the pdfs f1 and f2 from these measures.   
                                                 
3 This is a necessary technical assumption.  Because we will later define a new function that is the ratio of 
f1 and f2, we require this assumption to preclude dividing by 0.  It says, in effect, that neither of the two 
players ever considers any part of the cake worthless.  
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In brief, the rules of our algorithm for dividing a cake are as follows (details, with 
examples, follow later):4 
 
1. Two players, player 1 and player 2, independently submit their pdfs to a referee, 
who could be a computer that accepts this information.  (The referee makes only 
“objective” decisions based on this information.) 
2. The referee places marks on the cake at all points where the pdfs cross (either by 
intersecting at a point, or by discontinuously jumping over each other).  Initially, 
the referee awards each subinterval, defined by two adjacent marks, to the player 
whose pdf is greater in that subinterval.  
3. If the players’ pdfs do not cross at a point but are equal over some subinterval, 
then the referee places marks at the endpoints of this subinterval and awards it to 
player 1 initially.  
4. If the sum of the areas that the two players receive from their subintervals are 
equal, the algorithm terminates.  The players receive the subintervals that they 
were awarded initially. 
5. If the areas are not equal, the player who receives the larger sum (say, player 1) 
gives subintervals, or portions thereof (i.e., sub-subintervals), to player 2 
according to the ratio of player 1’s pdf to player 2’s pdf, starting with the 
subinterval in which this ratio is the smallest (possibly 1 if the players pdfs are 
equal on some subinterval) and letting this ratio increase.  
6. This giveback process may entail awarding sub-subintervals from different 
subintervals that player 1 was awarded initially.  When the areas of the two 
players are equal, the algorithm terminates.   
 
In an earlier article (Barbanel and Brams, 2011), but in a different context (pie-
cutting), we asked the question of whether a player would be truthful in submitting his or 
her pdf to the referee.  After all, if player 1 has some information about the pdf that 
player 2 will submit, might player 1 be able to submit a false pdf that increases the value 
of his portion of the cake, compared with what he would receive if he were truthful? 
 
The answer is “yes,” but unless player 1’s information is complete (e.g., obtained 
from a spy who received advance information on the pdf that player 2 would submit to 
the referee), this is a risky strategy to pursue.  If player 1 is off by the slightest amount, he 
could end up actually doing worse than if he were truthful, which guarantees him a 
minimum of 50 percent of his value of the cake, and generally more.  We will return to 
this point in section 5, where we compare our algorithm with Adjusted Winner.  
                                                 
4 Independently, Cohler, Lai, Parkes, and Procaccia (2011) give an algorithm (Algorithm 2) that is very 
similar to ours.  Whereas we focus on efficient allocations that are equitable, they focus on those which 
maximize the total valuation of the players, which may be different.  They restrict their algorithm to 
piecewise linear pdfs, whereas we consider other functions; also, we relate our algorithm to Adjusted 
Winner, which assumes, in effect, piecewise constant pdfs.  In footnote 5 we mention other differences in 
our approach and theirs in the aforementioned paper and a related paper with overlapping authors, which 
reflects a computer-science perspective that we regard as complementary to our approach. 
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3.  Finding Perfect Divisions 
 
In general, many divisions of a cake are efficient (e.g., giving all the cake to one 
player), and at least one is equitable.  Obtaining envy-freeness is trivial because, as we 
will see, it follows from the satisfaction of efficiency and equitability. 
 
The key to finding a perfect division, and determining the number of cuts that it 
requires, is the relative worth of each point of the cake—which we shall refer to as a bit 
of cake—to the two players.  We assume that f1 and f2 are each piecewise continuous (i.e., 
each comprises a finite number of continuous pieces) as well as being positive over the 
domain [0,1]. 
 
For each bit k of cake, let .  Then f is a function with domain [0,1] 
that takes on only positive values.  When player 1 values a bit more than player 2, f is  
greater than 1; otherwise, f is less than or equal to 1 (when player 2 values a bit at least as 
much as player 1).   
 
Let G be the graph of f.  G need not be connected; because f1 and f2 are each 
piecewise continuous, however, so is f, and hence G comprises a finite number of 
connected pieces.  Since f provides a bijection between the cake C and the graph G, we 
can identify C with G.  Any division of the graph G into portions corresponds to a 
division of the cake C into portions.  We exploit this identification between C and G in 
what follows by sometimes referring to G as the cake itself.   
 
Efficiency 
 
To obtain an efficient division of G, consider giving each bit of cake to the player 
who values it more, and arbitrarily giving out any bits of cake that are valued equally by 
the two players.  (We must be cautious with this intuition, however, because, as noted 
earlier, any one bit of cake has value zero to each player.)  Any division so obtained—
and there may be more than one if the players value some interval equally—is efficient, 
as we will show.  However, something much more general is also true.  
 
Fix any α > 0, and draw the line y = α in the same figure as the graph G.  This 
horizontal line divides G.  Give all of G that is above the line y = α to player 1, and all of 
G below the line y = α to player 2.  We call such a division <A,B> of the cake, whereby 
player 1 receives portion A and player 2 receives portion B, an α-division.    
 
f (k) = f1(k)f2 (k)
 7 
More formally, <A,B> is an α-division if and only if for any k ∈ A, , 
and for any k ∈ B, .  Because we have not specified what happens to points on 
G which coincide with the line y = α, where α > 0, there may be more than one α-
division for a fixed such α  (about which we will say more later).  Notice that the 
algorithm we presented in section 2 yields an initial division that is a 1-division; the 
adjustments (in step 6 of the algorithm) correspond to changing the value of α from α = 
1. 
 
Claim.  A division <A,B>  of the cake is efficient if and only if for some α > 0, it is an α-
division. 
 Before proving the claim, we illustrate our analysis with four examples of pairs of 
pdfs.  Their corresponding graphs G are shown in Figure 1, in which f1 is the small-block 
curve and f2 is the large-block curve. (For simplicity, these examples involve only linear 
functions.)   
Figure 1 about here 
Example a: 
 
 
Example b:  
 
Example c: 
 
 
Example d:  
These functions are all piecewise linear (i.e., each comprises a finite number of linear 
pieces).  The functions in examples 1a, 1c, and 1d, are also piecewise constant (i.e., each 
comprises a finite number of constant pieces).  We also note that, as required, the area 
under each pdf is 1.  
f1(k)
f2 (k)
! "
f1(k)
f2 (k)
! "
f1(x) =
1.5 for 0 ! x < 0.6
0.25 for 0.6 ! x ! 1
"
#
$
f2 (x) =
0.625 for 0 ! x < 0.4
1.25 for 0.4 ! x ! 1
"
#
$
f1(x) = 2x for 0 ! x !1
f2 (x) = 1 for 0 ! x !1
f1(x) =
0.8 for 0 ! x < 0.25, 0.5 ! x < 0.75
1.2 for 0.25 ! x < 0.5, 0.75 ! x ! 1
"
#
$
f2 (x) =
1.2 for 0 ! x < 0.25, 0.5 ! x < 0.75
0.8 for 0.25 ! x < 0.5, 0.75 ! x ! 1
"
#
$
f1(x) =
0.8 for 0 ! x < 0.25, 0.5 ! x < 0.75
1.2 for 0.25 ! x < 0.5, 0.75 ! x ! 1
"
#
$
f2 (x) = 1 for 0 ! x ! 1
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In Figure 2, we show the graphs G of f = f1/f2 corresponding to each of the 
examples in Figure 1.  In examples 1b and 1d, the graph G is the same as the graph of f1, 
player 1’s pdf, because f2 has a constant value of 1 (i.e., it is a uniform pdf) and, hence, 
for any bit of cake k in each of these two examples, . 
Figure 2 about here 
Next, we use G to find efficient divisions.  Intuitively, efficient divisions should 
give pieces of G having big y-coordinates to player 1 (since player 1 puts high value on 
these pieces), and pieces of G having small y-coordinates to player 2 (since player 2 puts 
high value on these pieces).   
 
In Figure 3, G is the darker graph in each example.  To illustrate the calculation of 
an equitable allocation, we have drawn two horizontal lines in Figure 3a at y = 2 and y = 
1.2.  First consider the line y = 2.  Making this the dividing line for allocating cake to 
players 1 and 2, we give all of G above this line to player 1, and all of G below this line 
to player 2.  Thus, player 1’s portion of the original cake (i.e., the line interval [0,1]) is 
[0,0.4), and player 2’s portion is [0.4,1].  Using the players’ pdfs, we find that player 1’s 
valuation of his portion is (0.4)(1.5) = 0.6, and player 2’s valuation of her portion is 
(0.6)(1.25) = 0.75.  Clearly, this is not an equitable division, but by our claim it is 
efficient. 
Figure 3 about here 
Next, consider the other horizontal line in Figure 3a, y = 1.2.  Using this line, we 
give interval [0,0.4) to player 1, and interval [0.6,1] to player 2.  Because the part of G 
corresponding to interval [0.4,0.6) is on the line y = 1.2, any division of this piece of cake 
between the players yields an efficient division.  Thus, while there is just one efficient 
division arising from the line y = 2, there are many arising from the line y = 1.2. 
 
In Figure 3b, we show the horizontal line , which is not an arbitrary 
choice, as we will see shortly.  The x-coordinate of the point of intersection of this line 
with G is .  Hence, in the associated efficient division of the original cake, player 
1’s portion is the interval , and player 2’s portion is the interval .  
(We have assigned the bit of cake at x =  arbitrarily, since a single bit has no value 
to either player.)  We use the players’ pdfs to compute each player’s valuation of his or 
her own portion as follows: 
 
f (k) = f1(k)f2 (k)
=
f1(k)
1 = f1(k)
y = 5 !1
5 !1
2
5 !1
2 ,1
"
#
$
%
&
' 0, 5 !12
"
#
$
%
&'
5 !1
2
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Player 1: {Area under the line y = 2x from  to x = 1} = 
               area of top triangle + area of bottom rectangle =  
               
(base)(height) + (base)(height) = 
               
1
2
!
"#
$
%& 1'
5 '1
2
!
"#
$
%&
(
)
*
*
+
,
-
-
2 ' 5 '1( )() +, + 1' 5 '12
!
"#
$
%&
(
)
*
*
+
,
-
-
5 '1( ) = 5 '12
  
Player 2: {Area of rectangle from x = 0 to } =
 
                
(base)(height) =
   
                 Thus, we see that besides being efficient, this division is equitable, which is why we 
chose the dividing line .  (We will have more to say about this shortly.) 
 
Proof of Claim 
 
To establish the forward direction of the claim, assume that for no α > 0 is <A,B> 
an α-division.  We must show that <A,B> is not efficient.  Our assumption implies that 
no horizontal line can be drawn so that all of A lies on or above this line, and all of B lies 
on or below this line.  It follows that there are pieces of cake A' ⊆ A and B' ⊆ B with all of 
A' below all of B' (i.e., each point of A' has a y-coordinate that is less than the y-
coordinate of each point of B'). 
 
We may assume (by shrinking either A' or B', if necessary) that µ1(A') = µ1(B').  
Because all of A' is below all of B', we know that for any ka ∈ A' and kb ∈ B', 
.  This implies that and, hence, that µ2(A') > µ2(B').  
Finally, we compare the division <A,B> with the division <(A\A') ∪ B',(B\B') ∪ A'>, 
which we can view as being obtained from <A,B> by having the players trade the pieces 
A' and B'.  Player 1 equally values these two divisions (since µ1(A') = µ1(B')), but player 2 
values the division <(A\A') ∪ B',(B\B') ∪ A'> more (since µ2(A') > µ2(B')).  This implies 
that <A,B> is not efficient.
  
To establish the reverse direction of the claim, fix some α > 0 such that <A,B> is 
an α-division.  We must show that <A,B> is efficient.   
 
x = 5 !12
1
2
!
"#
$
%&
x = 5 !12
5 !1
2
"
#$
%
&'
1( ) = 5 !12
y = 5 !1
f1(ka )
f2 (ka )
<
f1(kb )
f2 (kb )
µ1(A ')
µ2 (A ')
<
µ1(B ')
µ2 (B ')
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For any k ∈ A, , and for any k ∈ B, .  This tells us that for any 
A' ⊆ A and B ' ⊆ B, ,  and, hence, and 
.   
 
Changing from a division of the cake <A,B> to some other division can be viewed 
as a trade between players 1 and 2 of some A' ⊆ A and B' ⊆ B.  Suppose that player 1 
values his new portion more than he values A, his original portion.  This means that 
µ1(B') > µ1(A'), and, hence, αµ2(A') ≤ µ1(A') < µ1(B') ≤ αµ2(B').  Thus, µ2(A') < µ2(B'), 
which tells us that player 2 values her new portion less than she valued B, her original 
portion.  This establishes that any trade that increases one player’s valuation must 
decrease the other player’s valuation.  Consequently, <A,B> is efficient, which 
establishes the claim. 
 
Equitability 
 
The claim tells us that there is at least one efficient division associated with any 
horizontal line.  We are now ready to consider divisions that are both efficient and 
equitable.  The method for obtaining equitability is straightforward.  Suppose that α1,α2 > 
0, with α1 near zero and α2 a large positive number.  Then for any division associated 
with the line y = α1, player 1 will get what he considers to be a large portion, whereas 
player 2 will get what she considers to be a small portion.  By contrast, in any division 
associated with the line y = α2, the situation will be reversed.   
 
Recall that an equitable division is one in which the two players value their 
portions equally.  The lines y = α1 and y = α2 give efficient divisions that are on the two 
extremes of being inequitable, the first favoring player 1 and the second player 2.  We 
wish to adjust α so that (one of) the division(s) associated with the line y = α gives the 
two players portions that they value equally.  We imagine moving a horizontal line from 
just above the x-axis gradually upwards, stopping at the point where some division 
associated with this line gives equal values (in each player’s own measure) to the two 
players. 
 
This adjusting of α is easy to accomplish in example b (see Figure 3b).  By 
continuously changing α from small to large positive values, the divisions obtained from 
using the line y = α start by giving large portions to player 1 and small portions to player 
2 and then switch, eventually giving large portions to player 2 and small portions to 
player 1.  To calculate the changeover point (i.e., the point at which the players value 
their portions equally), we first compute each player’s valuation of his and her portion in 
terms of α, using that player’s pdf: 
 
 
Player 1: {Area under the line y = 2x from x = α/2 to x = 1} = 
f1(k)
f2 (k)
! " f1(k)f2 (k)
! "
µ1(A ')
µ2 (A ')
! " µ1(B ')
µ2 (B ')
! " µ1(A ') ! "µ2 (A ')
µ1(B ') ! "µ2 (B ')
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               area of top triangle + area of bottom rectangle = 
1
2
!
"#
$
%&
( base)(height) + (base)(height) = 
1
2
!
"#
$
%&
1' (2
!
"#
$
%&
)
*+
,
-.
2 '([ ] + 1' (2
!
"#
$
%&
)
*+
,
-.
(( ) = 1' (
2
4  
 
Player 2: {Area of rectangle from x = 0 to x = α/2} = 
(base)(height) = 
!
2
"
#$
%
&'
1( ) = !2  
 
We wish to choose α so that these two valuations are equal.  We compute the value of α 
as follows: 
 
1! "
2
4 =
"
2
" 2
4 +
"
2 !1 = 0
" 2 + 2" ! 4 = 0
" = !2 ± 202 = !1± 5  
 
Clearly, we must have α > 0, and thus we set ! = 5 "1 .  With this choice of α, each 
player values his or her portion at .  By the claim, this division is efficient.  Thus, 
we see that in this case a division that is efficient and equitable can be obtained with a 
single cut of the cake. 
 
The situation in example a is rather different (see Figure 3a).  Fix any α with 0.2 
< α < 1.2.  The division of G given by y = α gives more cake to player 1 than to player 2.  
In particular, for any such α, player 1 receives interval [0,0.6) and player 2 receives 
interval [0.6,1].  Thus, using the players’ pdfs, we find that player 1’s valuation of his 
piece is (0.6)(1.5) = .9, and player 2’s valuation of her piece is (0.4)(1.25) = 0.5.  Thus, 
any such division gives more to player 1 than to player 2.   
 
Next, fix any α with 1.2 < α < 2.  As we saw previously, this choice gives more 
cake to player 2 than to player 1.  In particular, player 1’s portion is the interval [0,0.4), 
which results in a valuation by player 1 of (0.4)(1.5) = 0.6, whereas player 2’s portion is 
the interval [0.4,1), which results in a valuation by player 2 of (0.6)(1.25) = 0.75.  Thus, 
if we want an equitable division, we must set α = 1.2.   
 
5 !1
2
 12 
There are many divisions associated with this horizontal line; we want to find one 
that divides the interval [0.4,0.6) in such a way as to produce equitability.  Let r denote 
the fraction of this interval that should go to player 1 (and hence 1-r is the fraction that 
player 2 should receive).  Then, since player 1 receives the interval [0,0.4) and player 2 
receives the interval [0.6.1], it follows that we must have (1.5)(0.4) + (1.5)(r)(0.2) = 
(1.25)(1-r)(0.2) + (1.25)(0.4), and hence r = 3/11.  Thus, player 1 must receive 3/11 of 
this segment and player 2 must receive 8/11 of this segment.  Because player 1’s portion 
must include segment [0,0.4), and player 2’s portion must include interval [0.6,1], we can 
ensure that the players obtain equitable portions, and also minimize the number of cuts 
needed, by cutting the interval [0.4,0.6) so that player 1 receives the left 3/11 of this piece 
and player 2 the right 8/11 of this piece.  Thus, the cut should be at x = 0.4 + (3/11)(0.2) =  
5/11, giving player 1 the interval [0,5/11), and player 2 the interval [5/11,1]. We verify 
this by noting that player 1’s valuation of his piece is (5/11)(1.5) = 15/22, and player 2’s 
valuation of her piece is [1-(5/11)](1.25) = 15/22.  The claim tells us that this division is 
efficient as well as being equitable. 
 
Next, consider example c (see Figure 3c).  Fix any α with 2/3 < α < 3/2.  If we 
use y = α to divide G, we obtain a division that gives portion [0.25,0.5) ∪ [0.75,1] to 
player 1 and portion [0,0.25) ∪ [0.5,0.75) to player 2.  Then player 1’s valuation of his 
portion, and player 2’s value of her portion, are both (0.5)(1.2) = 0.6.  Thus, this division 
is equitable and, by the claim, efficient. 
 
Finally, consider example d (Figure 3d).  This may look very similar to example c 
(indeed, player 1’s pdf is the same in these two examples, and the graphs G for these 
examples certainly look similar), but it is quite different.   Fix any α with 0.8 < α < 1.2.  
Using y = α to divide G, player 1’s portion is [0.25,0.5) ∪ [0.75,1], and player 2’s portion 
is [0,0.25) ∪ [0.5,0.75), exactly as in example c and, also as in example c, player 1’s 
valuation of his portion is (0.5)(1.2) = 0.6.  However, player 2’s valuation of her portion 
is (0.5)(1) = 0.5.  So while this division is efficient (by the claim), it is not equitable.   
 
To obtain an equitable division, consider the line y = 1.2.  We must determine 
how to divide the portion of the graph G that is on y = 1.2 (i.e., [0.25,0.5) ∪ [0.75,1]) 
between the two players so as to obtain an equitable division.  A straightforward 
calculation (similar to the calculation above for example a) shows that we must give 
10/11 of this portion to player 1 and 1/11 of this portion to player 2.   
 
Although there are many ways of dividing [0.25,0.5) ∪ [0.75,1] that will achieve 
this, we wish to minimize the number of cuts by making one cut in one of the two 
intervals that make up this portion.  Which one we cut is arbitrary.  We will cut the first 
piece in this portion (i.e., [0.25,0.5)) in such a way that player 1 gets the left part and 
player 2 the right part of this piece.  This results in the division that gives to player 1 the 
portion [0.25,0.25 + 9/44) ∪ [0.75,1] and to player 2 the portion [0,0.25) ∪ [0.25+ 
9/44),0.75).  We verify below that this efficient division is equitable: 
 
• Player 1’s valuation of his portion is (9/44 + 0.25)(1.2) = 6/11. 
• Player 2’s valuation of her portion = [0.25 + (0.75 - (0.25 + 9/44))](1) = 6/11. 
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Envy-freeness 
 
Our goal is to obtain a perfect division of G, which is not only efficient and 
equitable but also envy-free.  We have shown how to obtain a division satisfying the first 
two of these properties.  We now show that the third property follows from the first two.  
Suppose <A,B> is a division that is efficient and equitable.  Equitability tells us that µ1(A) 
= µ2(B).  This common value must be at least 0.5 because, if it were not, then both 
players would benefit from trading portions, and this would violate efficiency.  But if 
each player values his or her portion to be at least 0.5, then each player values the other 
player’s portion at most .5, and hence neither player is envious of the other player’s 
portion.  We note that envy-freeness does not follow from efficiency and equitability if 
there are more than two players. 
 
Different Entitlements 
 
 We close this section with a few comments on the possibility of different 
entitlements.  As an example, suppose that player 1 is entitled to 2/3 of the cake and 
player 2 is entitled to 1/3 of the cake.  Can we find a perfect division in this case?   
 
First, we must consider what it means for a division to be perfect.  Whereas 
efficiency retains its original meaning, we redefine envy-freeness in terms of the 
entitlements of the players.  Thus in our example, player 1 envies player 2 if and only if 
he values player 2’s portion at more than half of his own, and player 2 envies player 1 if 
and only if she values player 1’s portion at more than double her own.  As was true with 
equal entitlements, envy-freeness follows easily from efficiency and equitability. 
   
Equitability in our example means that player 1 values his portion at twice what 
player 2 values her portion.  How do we find an equitable division in the context of 
unequal entitlements?  We start with the line y = 2 instead of y = 1.  Above this line is 
cake that player 1 values at more than twice player 2’s valuation, and below this line is 
cake that player 2 values at more than half player 1’s valuation.  We move this line up or 
down until we find a line such that at least one division associated with this line produces 
the desired 2:1 ratio, which can readily be accomplished in our four earlier examples. 
 
 
4.  Determining The Maximum Number of Cuts Required 
 
 We have shown that a perfect division of a cake always exists and illustrated, in 
several simple examples, how to find it.  We also showed how entitlements can be taken 
into account in defining perfectness.  We next consider how to determine the number of 
cuts required to produce such a perfect division. 
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 As we observed earlier, the number of cuts in the original cake C corresponds to 
the number of cuts in the graph G.  Focusing on G rather than C, however, we must be 
careful: What is a cut of G?   
 
Although we continue to use a single horizontal line y = α to cut G, there may be 
more than one cut.  In fact, a cut occurs each time G crosses this line.  How can such a 
crossing occur?  There are three possibilities: 
 
i. G “jumps over” the line y = α (i.e., without crossing it at a point).  
ii. G crosses the line y = α at a point. 
iii. G and the line y = α share a line segment. 
 
These possibilities correspond, respectively, to no point of intersection of the players’ 
pdfs, a single point of intersection, and infinitely many points of intersection.  Figure 3a 
(with y = 2) and Figure 3c illustrate possibility (i); Figure 3b illustrates possibility (ii); 
Figure 3a (with y = 1.2) and Figure 3d illustrate possibility (iii).   
 
We note that these possibilities apply to any single crossing.  Two or all three of 
these possibilities may occur for the same cake and same line y = α.  In Figure 4, we 
show a graph G and the line y = 1 for which all three possibilities occur. 
Figure 4 about here 
 To count the number of cuts required to achieve perfection, we consider two 
cases.  Then we consider two examples that illustrate the limits of counting cuts.   
 
Case 1.  Both pdfs are piecewise constant.  This is the situation in examples a, c, 
and d in Figure 1.  Clearly, G is piecewise constant.  How many constant pieces make up 
G?  Suppose f1 (player 1’s pdf) is made up of m constant pieces, and f2 (player 2’s pdf) is 
made up of n constant pieces.  The ratio of f1 and f2 can change, at most, as often as there 
are endpoints of the intervals on which f1 and f2 are constant, not counting the endpoints 0 
and 1.  Hence, there are at most (m-1) + (n-1) = m+n-2 such changes, which tells us that 
G is made up of at most m+n-1 constant pieces.  Now consider the line y = α that divides 
G in an efficient and equitable manner.  Either this line does not intersect G, or else it 
intersects G in one or more line segments.  (Note that possibility (ii) above cannot occur 
in this case.) 
 
Suppose first that y = α does not intersect G (see Figure 3c).   It is possible that 
every constant piece that makes up G is on the opposite side of y = α from each constant 
piece adjacent to it.  Then there will be a cut between every pair of adjacent pieces.  It 
follows that we can obtain a perfect division with at most m+n-2 cuts. 
 
Suppose next that y = α intersects G in one or more line segments (see Figure 3a 
with y = 1.2 and Figure 3d).  Then, as we showed, we may need to cut inside one—but 
not more than one—of these line segments.  We can choose whether to cut so as to give 
the left part of this piece to player 1 and the right part to player 2, or vice versa, so that no 
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cut between this segment and at least one of the two adjacent segments is needed.  Thus, 
we see that we may have to make one cut inside one of the pieces on which G is constant, 
in which case we definitely do not cut between at least one pair of pieces on which G is 
constant.  It follows, as above, that we can obtain a perfect division with at most m+n-2 
cuts. 
 
Case 2.  Both pdfs are piecewise linear (but not necessarily piecewise constant).  
Suppose that player 1’s pdf is made up of m linear pieces, and player 2’s pdf is made up 
of n linear pieces.  Then, reasoning as in case 1, we see that G is made up of at most 
m+n-1 linear pieces.  The horizontal line y = α that produces a perfect division may 
intersect each of these linear pieces at most once, which means that we can obtain a 
perfect division with at most m+n-1 cuts.   
 
 This is illustrated in Figure 5, where the jagged graph is f1, player 1’s pdf, and 
player 2’s pdf, f2, is constantly 1.  Because f2 has a constant value of 1, graph G is the 
same as the graph of f1.  (It is easy to see, by symmetry considerations, that the area under 
f1 is 1.)  In this example, f1 is made up of 10 linear pieces and, therefore, so is G, and f2 is 
a single linear piece.  Our analysis above tells us that we will need at most 10+1-1 = 10 
cuts for a perfect division.  More specifically, we can see from the figure that we will 
need exactly 10 cuts, because G crosses any horizontal line y = α, where 0.5 < α < 1.5, 10 
times. 
Figure 5 about here 
 These two cases establish the truth of the following: 
 
Theorem. 
a. Suppose that both players’ pdfs are piecewise constant and that, in particular, 
player 1’s pdf is made up of m constant pieces, and player 2’s pdf is made up of n 
constant pieces.  Then, we can obtain a perfect division with at most m+n-2 cuts. 
b. Suppose that both players’ pdfs are piecewise linear and that, in particular, 
player 1’s pdf is made up of m linear pieces, and player 2’s pdf is made up of n 
linear pieces.  Then, we can obtain a perfect division with at most m+n-1 cuts. 
 
 It is clear from the example in Figure 5 that there is no uniform finite upper bound 
that can be placed on the number of cuts necessary to achieve a perfect division.  To be 
sure, for any positive integer t, we could revise this example in an obvious way so that a 
perfect division requires t cuts. 
 
 In concluding this section, we consider two questions: 
 
1. Can “linear” be changed to “monotone” in our analysis above? 
2. Is it always the case, even if we drop our piecewise-linear assumption, that it is 
possible to obtain a perfect division with a finite number of cuts. 
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The answer to both questions is “no.”  For question 1, consider Figure 6, in which f1 
is dotted and f2 is dashed in Figure 6a (f1 is the function 0.5 + x + (.025)sin(10πx), and f2 
is the function x + 0.5).  Standard calculus methods show that the areas under the graphs 
of each of these functions is 1, and that f1 is monotone increasing (f1' is never 0). 
Figure 6 about here 
The associated graph G is shown in Figure 6b.  Clearly, G will cross the line y = α 
that produces a perfect division many times, even though f1 and f2 are each (one-piece) 
monotone functions.  By changing f1, we can make the number of crossings as large as 
we want.  Hence, our results above for piecewise linear functions do not apply if we 
replace “linear” by “monotone.” 
 
For question 2, define f1 and f2 as follows: 
 
f1(x) =
1+ xsin(1 / x) for 0 ! x < 0.5
0.94 for .5 ! x !1
"
#
$
f2 (x) = 1 for 0 ! x !1
 
 
Numerical integration shows that the area under the graph of 1+ xsin(1/x) for the interval 
0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5 is approximately 0.53.  Our choice of 0.94 for the interval 0.5 ≤ x < 1 was 
dictated by the need to have the area under the graph of f1 be 0. 
 
The graph of f1 is shown in Figure 7.  Because f2 is constantly 1, the graph of f1 is 
the same as the graph of G.  Notice that G changes direction infinitely many times, with 
smaller and smaller periods, as we approach x = 0 from the right.  Clearly, G must cross 
any horizontal line y = α that produces a perfect division infinitely many times.  Thus, a 
perfect division in this case requires infinitely many cuts.   
 
Figure 7 about here 
 
We note that there is nothing significant about the fact that this function is not 
made up of linear pieces.  It is easy to imagine “straightening out” G between the high 
points and low points so as to make it comprise an infinite number of linear pieces, 
exhibiting the same sort of behavior (in terms of the need for infinitely many cuts to 
produce a perfect division) as in the present example. 
 
Finally, it is worth pointing out that our algorithm is also applicable to the perfect 
division of a pie, which can be visualized as a cake whose endpieces are connected.  The 
only difference is that there may or may not be a cut at the point of connection 
(depending on whether or not the two end pieces go to the same player).  However, the 
initial distribution of pieces—to the player that values each more—is the same, with the 
giveback process identical until equitability is achieved.  While cake-cutting and pie-
cutting differ in important ways (Barbanel, Brams, and Stromquist, 2009), when there are 
just two players, finding a perfect division of a cake and of a pie are essentially the same. 
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5.  Relationship to Adjusted Winner 
 
Adjusted Winner (AW) is a fair-division procedure in which each of two players 
distribute a fixed number of points to a set of divisible homogenous goods (Brams and 
Taylor, 1996, 1999).  AW produces a division of goods that is perfect—efficient, envy-
free, and equitable—in which at most one of the goods must be divided in a specified 
ratio between the players; all other goods are distributed in their entirety to one or the 
other of the two players. 
    
 AW can be seen as a special case of the method we have presented.  Suppose that 
there are n goods to be distributed between the two players.  Instead of the 100 points that 
is usually used in AW (of course, the choice of 100 is arbitrary), assume that each of the 
players has n points to distribute.   
 
 Arbitrarily order the goods g1, g2, …, gn.  Associate the goods with equal-sized 
pieces of the line segment [0,1]: g1 is associated with [0,1/n), g2 with [1/n,2/n), … , gn 
with [(n-1)/n,1].  Intuitively, we may imagine that each good has size 1/n, and the goods 
are lined up on the interval [0,1].  This is our cake (Jones, 1992, uses a somewhat 
different construction to connect AW to cake-cutting).   
 
Each player’s pdf at every point in [0,1] is then given by the number of points that 
that player associates with the good that includes this point.  In this manner, we define the 
two players’ pdfs. We see that each pdf is a piecewise constant function and, by our 
choice of n points in total, the area under each pdf is 1.   
 
For example, these pdfs might look like those in Figure 1a, 1c, or 1d.  The method 
given by AW can then be seen as a special case of the method described in this paper.  
We consider the graph G, as in Figures 2a, 2c, and 2d, and start by trying the line y = 1 
(i.e., giving each good to the player who puts the higher value on it; above the line means 
player 1, below means player 2).  We then adjust the line up or down—depending on 
which way the transfer must go—transferring first from goods whose associated line 
segment in G is closest to y = 1, and then moving farther away, as needed.   
 
In our general setting, the only cuts needed will be at the endpoints of pieces on 
which the pdfs are constant, plus at most one additional cut inside of one piece.  Of 
course, there are no actual cuts at endpoints, because the goods are separate; they were 
artificially put together to form a cake.  So the only possible cut is the one inside some 
interval on which the pdfs are constant, which coincides with AW.  As is true of AW, if 
the players are truthful about their pdfs, they can ensure that they will receive at least half 
the cake—as they value it—and otherwise not, which gives them a strong incentive not to 
dissemble, especially if they are risk-averse (Brams and Taylor, 1996, 1999).  
 
6.  Conclusions 
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We proposed a 2-person cake-cutting procedure, in which the players submit their 
valuations of a cake (i.e., their pdfs) to a referee.  The referee initially assigns parts of the 
cake to the player who values it more (i.e., whose pdf is greater), which will not generally 
produce an equitable division. 
 
This necessitates a giveback process: The player who values his or her portion 
more gives parts of this portion back to the other player, starting with those parts in 
which the ratio of the players’ pdfs is closest to 1, until the players value their portions 
equally.  This allocation is not only equitable but also envy-free and efficient—that is, 
perfect.  It can be accomplished with a finite number of cuts if the players’ pdfs are 
piecewise linear, but if they are not (even if they are piecewise continuous), an infinite 
number of cuts may be required. 
 
In practical applications, we think it reasonable to restrict the players to piecewise 
linear pdfs.  Then our algorithm can be used to parcel out not only cake but also a 
divisible good like land.  Consider, for example, beachfront property co-owned by two 
developers, who wish to build houses or hotels on the strips that they consider most 
valuable.  Our algorithm could be used to determine who gets what strips (though a 
potential problem might be that the players end up with strips that they consider too 
narrow to develop).5 
 
We note that the idea of considering ratios of players’ pdfs to find efficient 
divisions of a cake is not new.  It was used by Weller (1985) and by Barbanel (2000, 
2005), although the geometric structure used there, which makes no continuity 
assumptions, is rather different from the one we use here.  (It was called the “Radon-
Nikodym Set” in Barbanel (2000, 2005).)  The focus of this approach is on proving the 
existence of efficient and envy-free divisions, not on providing algorithms for finding 
them. 
 
We close by briefly discussing the degree to which we are justified in calling our 
method an “algorithm.”  Recall that we assume that each player knows his or her own 
preferences, represented by a pdf, and communicates this information to a referee, who 
uses it to decide on the location of the cuts.   
 
If the pdfs are simple functions, such as the constant functions of Adjusted 
Winner or piecewise linear functions, then they can readily be conveyed to a referee, who 
                                                 
5 Caragiannis, Lai, and Procaccia (2011) take into account this possibility in their analysis of “piecewise 
uniform with minimum length” (PUML) approximate algorithms, which give proportional (for n persons) 
and envy-free (for 2 persons) solutions that require that the players obtain minimal-length portions.  The 
algorithms are not exact and do not incorporate the property of equitability.  In Cohler, Lai, Parkes, and 
Procaccia (2011), approximate 2-person and n-person algorithms that give the most efficient of envy-free 
solutions are analyzed, but these, too, do not incorporate equitability; also, their notion of efficiency—to 
maximize the total valuation of the players—while it satisfies our notion of efficiency in section 1, is more 
specific, excluding allocations that ours includes.  A focus of both these papers is on algorithms that run in 
polynomial time, which our exact algorihm trivially does (except when an infinite number of cuts is 
required). 
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implements the algorithm.  If, however, the pdfs have, for example, infinitely many 
discontinuities, then it is far from clear how, practically speaking, to communicate this 
information to the referee, or how the referee can find the cut locations.  While in theory 
such problems may arise, in practice we do not see them as insuperable barriers to 
dividing land or other divisible goods.   
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